Post by insterburger on Jan 31, 2014 16:43:08 GMT -5
I certainly learned a good number of lessons, from the practical side of cold-weather airsoft (and WWII airsoft in general), command and control, as well as tactics and movement.
The very first thing worth mentioning that happened after contact with the enemy was the pot metal "cleaning rod" on my k98 snapping like a twig when I bumped it into a tree. It must have flown off somewhere pretty far off, because I never did find it. Luckily it should be a relatively easy fix (which will actually constitute an upgrade), and after that I suffered no further failures. It seems that my StG44 that I loaned out performed well too, I don't think there was any need to change batteries there either.
I do think semi-auto/bolt is the way to go for the future of WWII airsoft, in the NE and eveywhere. The combat was every bit as intense, being under fire was every bit as harrowing, but it added a dimension of realism that made a huge difference. There was one incident in the final combat where Nate was coming up on my flank and didn't see me. I had a clean aimed shot at him, and missed him by inches. He keyed in on me, returned fire, and took me out. If we had been on full auto, I'd have lit him up and that would have been that, but I liked the idea of being in a situation where that one shot hitting or missing is life or death (even though I was on the wrong end). That is combat. I don't think the single shot format hurt in terms of calling hits-- for the most part it was pretty obvious when I got shot (I did miss one that I realized later, but it made no difference since I took a second hit that I did feel about 10 seconds later). Even with the added layers, I feel like if anything the calling of hits is getting tighter and more honest. So hats off to all the participants for that.
My suggestion would be for games to keep up the single shot format. I think specific rules should be on a game-by-game basis and influenced by the relative sizes of forces, but as a rule of thumb I would say that the following would make sense:
3 or fewer players per team/squad (I hope these days are over!): Case by case, but consider allowing full auto for all
4-9 players per team/squad: 1 dedicated machine gunner, all other players firing semi or bolt
10+ players per team/squad: Go to the actual WWII format: One heavy machine gunner (high ROF/FPS full auto), squad leader has low FPS/ROF machine pistol with limited ammo (MP40 or low FPS Thompson), and everyone else as riflemen.
Again, this could be tweaked on a case-by-case basis. The joy of it is that it really allows game hosts to fine tune firepower to adjust for size of force... a team with two fewer players could be given an extra auto gunner, etc.
As for command, all of John's comments are spot on. It was only after seeing what happens to troops in the field with no chain of command and an absent commander that I realized just how important CoC is. What else I found is that command is MUCH more about being responsible to your troops than it is about them being responsible to you. I found that the more clearly I defined responsibilities BEFORE engagement, the better our force operated as a cohesive unit. When people knew exactly where they were supposed to deploy and what sector of our front they were responsible for, they were highly effective in fulfilling their missions. When I was less effective in managing that information, the same guys fighting just as hard were not as successful. But all of that was on me, not them. It was my first time in a command position, and while there are decided benefits to NOT being in charge and just managing yourself, I do look forward to the next opportunity to apply the lessons I learned.
The most important thing was to take and maintain the initiative. During the first action, I at first failed to do that, and my force pretty much stalled out in our mission. It was only when I returned to combat after being killed and took decisive steps to move our troops into a fluid battle instead of a static slugfest that we were able to acheive our objective. I think the operative phrase belongs to Danton: "L'audace, et encore l'audace, et toujours l'audace!" ("Audacity, and more audacity, and always audacity!"). Of course that can backfire-- when Nate took the defense of Bastogne into an offensive operation against the German force, it was a brilliant stroke and he truly caught us with our pants down. If I had not been able to disengage our force and rearguard out to a place where we could drive on our objective from a completely different angle, he would have been entirely successful. I had learned that lesson the day before when the Germans got eradicated by Nate's guys in the second action precisely because I was not able to disengage, regroup, and re-engage on more favorable terms. I think Nate's "the best defense is a good offense" strategy might well have worked had he made some provision-- any provision-- to defend the fort. A bigger force would have made this possible, but he could have done it by just leaving one guy behind with the means to signal the rest of the force that the base was under attack. That would have put the German force in a very unfavorable crossfire situation instead of letting the Germans occupy the objective without firing a shot. If that action had occurred with Saturday's forces he probably would have done just that, squeezed the attacking force between his base and his assault troops and won handily, but late on Sunday it was a grand gamble that didn't pay off.
I would say that perhaps the biggest lesson for me is summed up right there: Being able to disengage from an unfavorable situation to create the opportunity to re-engage in a way that favors your force is essential. While it can be very tempting to hold your ground and slug it out, sometimes pulling out of combat and giving ground to create a better tactical situation is the best course of action. While that was my tactical lesson for the weekend, the same principle on the strategic level is precisely what lost WWII for Germany.
The very first thing worth mentioning that happened after contact with the enemy was the pot metal "cleaning rod" on my k98 snapping like a twig when I bumped it into a tree. It must have flown off somewhere pretty far off, because I never did find it. Luckily it should be a relatively easy fix (which will actually constitute an upgrade), and after that I suffered no further failures. It seems that my StG44 that I loaned out performed well too, I don't think there was any need to change batteries there either.
I do think semi-auto/bolt is the way to go for the future of WWII airsoft, in the NE and eveywhere. The combat was every bit as intense, being under fire was every bit as harrowing, but it added a dimension of realism that made a huge difference. There was one incident in the final combat where Nate was coming up on my flank and didn't see me. I had a clean aimed shot at him, and missed him by inches. He keyed in on me, returned fire, and took me out. If we had been on full auto, I'd have lit him up and that would have been that, but I liked the idea of being in a situation where that one shot hitting or missing is life or death (even though I was on the wrong end). That is combat. I don't think the single shot format hurt in terms of calling hits-- for the most part it was pretty obvious when I got shot (I did miss one that I realized later, but it made no difference since I took a second hit that I did feel about 10 seconds later). Even with the added layers, I feel like if anything the calling of hits is getting tighter and more honest. So hats off to all the participants for that.
My suggestion would be for games to keep up the single shot format. I think specific rules should be on a game-by-game basis and influenced by the relative sizes of forces, but as a rule of thumb I would say that the following would make sense:
3 or fewer players per team/squad (I hope these days are over!): Case by case, but consider allowing full auto for all
4-9 players per team/squad: 1 dedicated machine gunner, all other players firing semi or bolt
10+ players per team/squad: Go to the actual WWII format: One heavy machine gunner (high ROF/FPS full auto), squad leader has low FPS/ROF machine pistol with limited ammo (MP40 or low FPS Thompson), and everyone else as riflemen.
Again, this could be tweaked on a case-by-case basis. The joy of it is that it really allows game hosts to fine tune firepower to adjust for size of force... a team with two fewer players could be given an extra auto gunner, etc.
As for command, all of John's comments are spot on. It was only after seeing what happens to troops in the field with no chain of command and an absent commander that I realized just how important CoC is. What else I found is that command is MUCH more about being responsible to your troops than it is about them being responsible to you. I found that the more clearly I defined responsibilities BEFORE engagement, the better our force operated as a cohesive unit. When people knew exactly where they were supposed to deploy and what sector of our front they were responsible for, they were highly effective in fulfilling their missions. When I was less effective in managing that information, the same guys fighting just as hard were not as successful. But all of that was on me, not them. It was my first time in a command position, and while there are decided benefits to NOT being in charge and just managing yourself, I do look forward to the next opportunity to apply the lessons I learned.
The most important thing was to take and maintain the initiative. During the first action, I at first failed to do that, and my force pretty much stalled out in our mission. It was only when I returned to combat after being killed and took decisive steps to move our troops into a fluid battle instead of a static slugfest that we were able to acheive our objective. I think the operative phrase belongs to Danton: "L'audace, et encore l'audace, et toujours l'audace!" ("Audacity, and more audacity, and always audacity!"). Of course that can backfire-- when Nate took the defense of Bastogne into an offensive operation against the German force, it was a brilliant stroke and he truly caught us with our pants down. If I had not been able to disengage our force and rearguard out to a place where we could drive on our objective from a completely different angle, he would have been entirely successful. I had learned that lesson the day before when the Germans got eradicated by Nate's guys in the second action precisely because I was not able to disengage, regroup, and re-engage on more favorable terms. I think Nate's "the best defense is a good offense" strategy might well have worked had he made some provision-- any provision-- to defend the fort. A bigger force would have made this possible, but he could have done it by just leaving one guy behind with the means to signal the rest of the force that the base was under attack. That would have put the German force in a very unfavorable crossfire situation instead of letting the Germans occupy the objective without firing a shot. If that action had occurred with Saturday's forces he probably would have done just that, squeezed the attacking force between his base and his assault troops and won handily, but late on Sunday it was a grand gamble that didn't pay off.
I would say that perhaps the biggest lesson for me is summed up right there: Being able to disengage from an unfavorable situation to create the opportunity to re-engage in a way that favors your force is essential. While it can be very tempting to hold your ground and slug it out, sometimes pulling out of combat and giving ground to create a better tactical situation is the best course of action. While that was my tactical lesson for the weekend, the same principle on the strategic level is precisely what lost WWII for Germany.