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Post by volkssturm on Nov 29, 2012 17:47:36 GMT -5
I've long had a fascination with the M2 Medium tank en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M2_Medium_TankYeah, it's kind of a weird combination of good and bad ideas. It was obsolete before it could have been fielded. But for a brief window, from 1939 to summer 1940 it actually might have done ok. The automotive end was good, and was the basis for the M3 and M4. Armor protection was decent for the period, and the 37 mm gun (basically a copy of the German 37mm) could defeat the PZKW I and III and 35(T) and 38(T) tanks that made up the majority of German armor in the Battle of France. It was far better than the MKVI light tanks the British were still fielding, and slower but better armored than the contemporary British cruiser tanks. SO, for the sake of alternate history, let's say the US gets it's tank act together a little quicker and the M2 Medium, and also the M2A4 Light tank, are ready for production a year earlier. In 1937 the British decide to form three armored divisions instead of one. British production can barely produce the 600+ tanks needed for one division. So in 1938 they send a purchasing commission to see what the Yanks have and order up 600 M2 Mediums and 600 M2A4's. Miraculously they get them to France in the spring of 1940. At the Battle of Arras the Germans find themselves facing a full armored division instead of two regiments. What happens? Game changers? German tactical skill and the Luftwaffe win despite the odds? Thoughts?
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2nd Bat
Master sergeant
Posts: 11,813
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Post by 2nd Bat on Nov 29, 2012 20:39:03 GMT -5
The shortfall the allies had in the battle for France was neither numbers or quality of their armor but rather the way it was used. french tanks were generally better than the German tanks they faced. Given the notion that attackers typically need a 3 to 1 advantage and 5 to 1 when facing fixed fortifications the Germans shocked everyone by succeeding with fairly equal numbers.
The Poles, French and British didnt understand the importance of defense in depth and fluidity of armored warfare. The tactics was the element that tipped the scale. The Allies had courage determination and desire and were well trainedbut unfortunately their training was misguided. Tanks were still primarily considered Infantry support weapons, portable artillery, not armored cavalry. A little known fact is that the brief invasion of Poland produced more German casualties than the French and British up to Dunkirk.
Add to this the extreme isolationist attitude of Americans with regard to the war in Europe and there is no way even if we had them in inventory that Roosevelt could have finageled their sale.
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