Post by 2nd Bat on Jun 15, 2006 2:27:41 GMT -5
It occured to me that this audience might be interested in an article I wrote many, many, many years ago. It will be one of five pre work articles of required reading for the Hooah Airsoft Recondo School. Students will be required to pass quizes on each article prior to attendance at the event. This pre-work is designed to minimize classroom time into brief reviews so the time spent at the course itself can focus on skills and action oriented mission application.
Anatomy of a RECONDO Patrol
By John Robison (LRRP) US Army (Ret.)
The following is a chronological description of what transpired from the beginning to the end of a well executed patrol. These are the procedures and processes followed by elite military units all over the world. Some terminology may have changed since I attended and taught at the US Army’s Rigorous Recondo school at Ft Lewis in the early 70’s. (Reconnaissance/ Commando) Most Infantry Divisions during the Vietnam War had a Recondo (LRRP) Company whose members were re-formulated into the reestablished 75th Ranger Regiment. I was proud to have served, with the 172nd Inf. Bde. (Abn), 2nd Bn. 75th Ranger Regmt, and the 1st Brigade (Recondo) of the 9th Infantry Division.
The first thing a unit would probably receive was a Frag Order which is short for Fragmentary Order also referred to as a warning order. In it the patrol leader would receive a brief description of the type of mission, anticipated departure time, weapons, equipment and expected duration of the mission. The patrol leader would then do a quick time line in reverse order to establish who needed to do what by when. From this, hard times, priorities and delegation of duties could be assigned. The patrol leader would then advise the patrol members of a pending mission and have them begin preparation by drawing ammo, packing up and generally get ready to go out. The patrol leader would provide a precise time for the full briefing and estimated departure time as well as any known hard times. He would then depart for the Tactical Operations Center, Headquarters or Briefing tent.
Once there he would get a detailed description of the Situation, Mission Objective, Administrative and Logistics involved as well as Communications and Support. He might also receive suggestions on the execution as it pertained to higher echelon support such as vehicles, helicopter assets, special assigned guides etc. The final details of the execution of the mission would be up to the patrol leader and his key team leaders. At this meeting he would receive maps, aerial photographs, special instructions, a briefing on weather, adjacent forces, enemy forces and disposition as well as any other details that might help him in his planning.
Following his briefing the patrol leader might meet with the other supporting element leaders, Drivers, Pilots, guides etc. Unit commanders whose forces he may have to pass through. If he’s lucky he would be able to go on a leader’s recon or conduct a helicopter fly-over, being careful to cover areas not involved in the mission so the enemy wouldn’t be tipped off to his coming.
While away the second in command would direct preparation and insure that time was being well spent. He might conduct inspections of equipment and weapons as well as refreshers or rehearsals on anticipated actions on the patrol. Things like how to cross trails, pass through friendly lines, Conduct tactical withdrawals, actions at the ORP, (Objective Rally Point) loading and unloading from choppers (especially the type they expected to use). All of these are SOPs, (Standard Operating Procedures) and have probably been done many times by all patrol members but they still are typically reviewed. Other things they may do are review hand signals, conduct commo checks, weapons checks and make sure ammunition was drawn and special weapons or equipment were available. If it was a deep penetration patrol the men might avoid eating non indigenous food and wear clothing that had been held over fires to give them the same Smokey odor as the enemy. Soap and after shave was a definite no-go. Anyone with a cough would be excluded from the patrol.
If it was a night mission special efforts to subdue equipment and faces would be done and there would be special attention paid to night vision equipment and signal gear. In addition with smaller recon patrols the unit may load their magazines with exclusively tracer rounds so if contact was made they would temporarily appear to be a larger more heavily armed unit than they were. Tape was placed on all sling swivels or slings would be removed altogether. Tape was placed across the plastic surfaces of M-16s to subdue their glare and improve noise discipline. Because Recondo units had often been issued 30 round banana magazines before the army had proper pouches built, empty canteen pouches were often used. Magazines incidently were always loaded a few rounds short to insure proper feeding. Once loaded they were tapped across the back surface to seat the rounds properly inside the magazine. These canteen pouches accommodated dual and even three magazines taped together which was commonly done. Bird chirp devices like you see in nature shops were sometimes carried to signal one another and to throw off probing enemy forces who wouldn’t expect birds to gather in a brushy clump occupied by a human. A Boot string was often attached to the front site arch in an M-16 so the weapon wouldn’t be lost if dropped in a stream or set down at night. These were often attached to a carbineer (snap link) on the LRRPs web gear.
Once prepared the patrol leader would gather his troops and share the complete details of the patrol mission. He would assign duties and lay out order of movement, actions at danger areas and his plan when at the objective. For actions at the objective he’d use sand tables or terrain boards to clarify his intent. He’d share with as much detail as possible the same formula he received at the briefing from headquarters. SITUATION, MISSION, EXECUTION, ADMINISTRATION, LOGISTICS, COMMAND & CONTROL, SUPPLY & SUPPORT. He’d seek questions and quiz his patrol members to insure complete understanding. He’d provide a final assembly departure time and announce hard times for inspections and rehearsals if deemed necessary. Prior to departure a commo check would be made, inspection and weapons check conducted. Each group would clearly understand who was assigned which tasks, who was responsible for what equipment and what the chain of command was from top to bottom and why the mission was important. Each man knew who was to be in which truck or helicopter and what the order of arrival as well as the order of movement was to be throughout the mission. A typical six man patrol of course all fit in a single helicopter unless inserted by STABO rigs.
Following this the patrol would move to the departure point to be loaded into trucks and brought to the line of departure or helicopter pad. Once there they typically waited ridiculously long while the cogs of the big green machine caught up with their needs. During this time some men sharpened knives, re-seated rounds in their magazines, fiddled with gear or tried to catch a few winks.
As the choppers arrived the troops loaded typically from a 45 degree angle from the front to each side of the chopper. In this way the pilot could see them and insure that the blades were pitched such that they wouldn’t decapitate any of the troops. And visually gauge when the chopper was loaded. Note that this was not true of the huge C-47 where you never approached from the front as the blade pitch was dangerously low at times. Far lower for example then a Huey! (With C-47s you always approached from the rear.) Each of the slicks would gain altitude and gather for their short trip to the LZ. Flying low to the ground the choppers would reduce their radar signature and the amount of time they would be exposed to ground fire. Typically the force would fake several landings at phony LZs. Once the troops were inserted the choppers would visit several additional sites again to confuse the enemy about where the troops were dropped. In Vietnam cutouts of soldiers were sometimes propped up in the chopper doors so enemy ground scouts would think the choppers still had troops on board.
Occasionally when no LZ was available large enough to accommodate a helicopter touch down, troops would either rappel into a tiny clearing or climb down rope ladders. This was practiced and trained on repeatedly back at base. Another more spectacular procedure was to be transported to the DZ by STABO rig. With a STABO rig, three troops would hook together using a special harness and be transported while suspended well below the helicopter. The helicopter or helicopters would fly low with the Recondo troops literally skimming the trees. This system was later improved with a better release mechanism called a Maguire Rig which was named after its creator. To my knowledge it is still in use today. Insertion or extraction by Maguire rig was rare but quite exciting especially at night. I did three such insertions/extractions which I think are more exciting then a night combat jump (I never however did a night combat jump)
Once on the ground the patrol typically moved slightly away from the LZ and laid low for 20 minutes to an hour to insure that the area was secure before moving out. They would report their situation just prior to departure often simply with a series of break squelch signals to avoid talking. Often few words were spoken even on a two or three day patrol. When words were shared they were shared in a low, close whisper. Their order of movement away from the LZ was pre-ordained and they frequently stopped to orient and assess the situation. They always had a point man designated. In deep enemy penetrations he occasionally might wear an enemy uniform with an AK-47 to delay immediate recognition in a chance encounter. As critical to the patrol as the point man, a rear security man focused on the area to the rear at all times.
While moving it was critical that the point man always remain in sight of the number two man. This distance would change frequently due to the terrain. At roads, trails or streams the patrol would typically halt and the patrol leader would be informed. The manner in which the patrol crossed these danger areas was rehearsed and done in accordance with the units SOPs and the situation. Typically the point man would halt the patrol and indicate a danger area (stream, trail, open area etc.) The patrol leader would indicate how he wanted it handled. Usually one, (occasionally two) men would cross and scout out the other side and the flanks. Forming a wide, heart like shape pattern of search to insure no enemy forces were there. Then the unit might cross simultaneously on line, singularly, or in small groups sprinting across. On the other side the process would typically be reversed and they would return to their original order of movement. Often times, known road streams or trails were designated as phase lines and the patrol leader might inform headquarters of their location at that time. They would typically refer to phase lines rather than grid coordinates.
Enroute there would be a number of route rally points where the unit would gather to asses the situation, disseminate where they were, or share details on what had happened. Small units would typically form a tight circle in these gatherings so maps could be pointed at and conversations (if done) could be done in a whisper. The small groups of typically six men would lay heel to heel in a circle facing outward whenever they stopped. This is the position they would lay in during the night. These locations were called RONs (Remain Over Night) and they were usually in preordained locations though they seldom stayed where originally planned due to the actual ground terrain or enemy situation. Often they would establish a RON at dusk but would have an alternative location 150 yards away or so that they would move quietly into, slightly after dark. This would provide additional security in the event they were spotted by the enemy earlier. Late in the war LRRPs were encouraged not to set out claymore mines around these RONs as experience taught them that to do so encouraged them to stay put too long if moved on by the enemy. If contact was made during the night they had a preplanned direction and gathering place some distance away. Usually at a location that couldn’t be missed even at night in the confusion of flight. A stream bed, low rise or trail head might be that point.
A fighting withdrawal from the RON (or while enroute) was rehearsed over and over and precise procedures were in place. Typically the patrol leader would shout out a clock designation and distance. EXAMPLE: “4 o’clock 300” and that meant withdraw in the direction of 4 o’clock from the direction of past movement, go 300 yards and gather there. Two patrol members would empty their magazines in the direction of the enemy while the others ran about 20 meters. Two predetermined members would then crouch and fire while the rest continued to run and the original two ran past trying to reload a magazine on the run. The next two would drop and fire and this would continue until contact was broken from the enemy. Once at the hasty rally point a quick assessment was made, everyone was accounted for and the patrol quickly headed out in a different direction from the route just taken. Note that during the withdrawal the firing was un- aimed fire. It was strictly intended to get the enemy to take cover and not follow or place aimed shots on the men running. CS gas was often dispersed to throw off pursuers or affect their dogs.
If all went well and contact wasn’t made enroute, the patrol would gather at the Objective Rally Point. All elements (even on a fairly large patrol such as a raid or ambush) would gather at this location forming a circle. Raids and Ambush patrols (Often called heavies) usually consisted of 10 or more men. Point or area recon patrols were usually four to six man patrols. Regardless of the size of the element, the location of the Objective Rally Point was critical. It should be easily defended for a brief period of time, easy for all elements to find even in a hurry and at night and while close to the objective, out of line of site and not likely to be stumbled upon by enemy patrols.
From the Objective Rally Point the Patrol leader and element leaders should move out to conduct a final leader’s recon. They would carefully approach the location of the ambush or objective of their raid. If it was an ambush location they would post security on the main approaches so they could be warned of enemy approach while inspecting the intended kill zone. If possible they would view the objective from all sides. Care would be taken to insure there were no signs of their presence within the kill zone that might alert the enemy that something was amiss. Once they completed the recon they returned to the ORP cautiously. Typically a silent challenge will be made with a password and counter sign. Often a designated number was used. EXAMPLE: The pass number for a given patrol might be Seven. If the challenge 3 were given the counter sign would be 4 since the two add up to 7. If the challenge were 2 the counter sign would be 5. Etc. Usually these weren’t necessary at the ORP as the patrol knew the patrol members well enough to recognize their posture and mannerisms when moving. Sometimes a running password was used and repeated consistently as patrol members approached the ORP. It’s best to pick a word difficult to say by enemy soldiers. “thistle, thistle, thistle” “Softball, softball, softball”
Once back at the ORP the patrol element leaders would conduct a final plan briefing which would then be shared with all team members. If not already posted such as during a raid patrol, The first to leave the ORP would be the security elements who would typically move out to likely enemy avenues of approach or key withdrawal route locations. (A foot bridge for instance). They would report by radio once they were in position. Often these radio reports would simply be a series of break squelches. Next would go the support element which would move to a secure firing position over looking the objective. The maneuver element with the patrol leader would move to a pre-established assault position usually in an “L” angle from the support or base of fire element. It would typically be headed by the second in command. The reason the patrol leader virtually always goes with the assault element is it is his job to insure that the mission is sufficiently completed. He must insure that the documents have been gathered, proper pictures taken, equipment destroyed, POW freed or prisoner snatched. Usually a single patrol member is left in the ORP to provide security and early warning if the ORP is compromised. Base of fire element indicates that they are ready and assault element indicates they are ready through a series of predetermined radio clicks.
A raid is characterized by surprise, maneuver and violence of action. The base of Fire or support element initiates fire and sweeps the objective mercilessly. Typically it fires from a range that allows for penetrating fire but too far away for effective counter fire. A pre established signal is given (A flare, whistle or horn) The support element would indicate with a repeated whistle or flare that it had received the request for shifted fires and the support element shifts it’s fire to the side or rear of the enemy. (away from the direction soon to be occupied by the assault element.) The assault element (knowing for sure that the support element got the word) sweeps the objective moving slightly through it and beyond providing a perimeter for the mission element. (Demo team, photo team, etc.) They (The mission team) place their charges, gather their Intel, take their pictures, search bodies or snatch their POW. Throughout this event the Support Element maintains constant fire to the enemy’s rear, securing the objective against counter attack and providing cover for the assault. In some cases they also sweep across the objective forming an L to the assault element again slightly beyond the objective. A signal is given by the patrol leader that the mission is completed and the assault element withdraws back to the ORP. This signal might be a flare, colored smoke, a horn, whistle or just loud shouts. An example of this series of whistle signals might be: A single long blast indicates initiate fire, Two blasts (repeated by the support element) might indicate shift fire or move up and across the objective. Finally Three blasts (repeated by both elements) might indicate mission completed move back to the rally point. The sequence for returning to the ORP was typically: The assault (mission) element, followed by the support element. Finally the security elements returns except any that might be placed to cover the withdrawal route. Once back at the ORP a quick count is made of all patrol members. There was typically, a quick disseminations of what happened and any intel (shared with all patrol members) and the patrol moved out. Even an ambush patrol and point reconnaissance mission was conducted and carried out in this way with an ORP and planned route in and out.
The withdrawal route from the ORP was always different than the route taken in to avoid the possibility that if they were spotted going in they could be ambushed coming out. Whenever possible the Pick up Zone (PZ) would be different than the LZ. (Same reason) The patrol leader would call in results of the mission and move out smartly taking equal or greater care going out as he used going in as in this case the enemy was fully aware and alert to the patrols presence. The extraction point was typically quite close to the objective relative to the LZ. If the execution of the patrol consisted of moving through friendly lines from a forward area or fire base this was often the scariest and most dangerous part of the mission. Friendly lines typically aren’t, especially at night. Procedures there were elaborate and merit a complete article!
There might be several patrols going on at once. Progress of the patrols was constantly monitored by the Operations Center. Many times units were beyond normal radio transmission range so relay stations were created and manned deep in enemy territory. The sole purpose of these relay stations was to transmit details of one or more patrols’ progress back to base. Often times these relay stations were placed on high ground and used large antenna extensions. Usually the simultaneous patrols were on different frequencies so their click signals would not be misinterpreted. Sometimes they were on the same frequencies so they would know immediately what was going on with their sister unit. Patrols almost always had the frequencies for the other units so if they heard distant shooting they could switch freqs to monitor what was going on. Some patrols lost radio contact and were literally never heard from again. If a radio ceased to function for whatever reason a mission would usually be aborted or cut short. If radio contact was lost for a prolonged period an alternative PZ location and time was established so a unit out of contact knew where to go and at what time to expect extraction.
Once back, all patrol members went through an elaborate debrief from the headquarters unit S-2 Intelligence officer and the unit stood down by turning in drawn equipment (once cleaned). They then took a well deserved rest and recuperation that typically lasted several days. It was typically equal to or greater than the duration of the patrol. A three day patrol would usually earn at least 5 days of well deserved stand down.
Othere articles of pre-work for the school Include: Ambushes, RTO procedures, Night Operations, and Immediate Action Drills,
I'd love to see some from this board attend the course so I'd get the chance to meet some of you.
Anatomy of a RECONDO Patrol
By John Robison (LRRP) US Army (Ret.)
The following is a chronological description of what transpired from the beginning to the end of a well executed patrol. These are the procedures and processes followed by elite military units all over the world. Some terminology may have changed since I attended and taught at the US Army’s Rigorous Recondo school at Ft Lewis in the early 70’s. (Reconnaissance/ Commando) Most Infantry Divisions during the Vietnam War had a Recondo (LRRP) Company whose members were re-formulated into the reestablished 75th Ranger Regiment. I was proud to have served, with the 172nd Inf. Bde. (Abn), 2nd Bn. 75th Ranger Regmt, and the 1st Brigade (Recondo) of the 9th Infantry Division.
The first thing a unit would probably receive was a Frag Order which is short for Fragmentary Order also referred to as a warning order. In it the patrol leader would receive a brief description of the type of mission, anticipated departure time, weapons, equipment and expected duration of the mission. The patrol leader would then do a quick time line in reverse order to establish who needed to do what by when. From this, hard times, priorities and delegation of duties could be assigned. The patrol leader would then advise the patrol members of a pending mission and have them begin preparation by drawing ammo, packing up and generally get ready to go out. The patrol leader would provide a precise time for the full briefing and estimated departure time as well as any known hard times. He would then depart for the Tactical Operations Center, Headquarters or Briefing tent.
Once there he would get a detailed description of the Situation, Mission Objective, Administrative and Logistics involved as well as Communications and Support. He might also receive suggestions on the execution as it pertained to higher echelon support such as vehicles, helicopter assets, special assigned guides etc. The final details of the execution of the mission would be up to the patrol leader and his key team leaders. At this meeting he would receive maps, aerial photographs, special instructions, a briefing on weather, adjacent forces, enemy forces and disposition as well as any other details that might help him in his planning.
Following his briefing the patrol leader might meet with the other supporting element leaders, Drivers, Pilots, guides etc. Unit commanders whose forces he may have to pass through. If he’s lucky he would be able to go on a leader’s recon or conduct a helicopter fly-over, being careful to cover areas not involved in the mission so the enemy wouldn’t be tipped off to his coming.
While away the second in command would direct preparation and insure that time was being well spent. He might conduct inspections of equipment and weapons as well as refreshers or rehearsals on anticipated actions on the patrol. Things like how to cross trails, pass through friendly lines, Conduct tactical withdrawals, actions at the ORP, (Objective Rally Point) loading and unloading from choppers (especially the type they expected to use). All of these are SOPs, (Standard Operating Procedures) and have probably been done many times by all patrol members but they still are typically reviewed. Other things they may do are review hand signals, conduct commo checks, weapons checks and make sure ammunition was drawn and special weapons or equipment were available. If it was a deep penetration patrol the men might avoid eating non indigenous food and wear clothing that had been held over fires to give them the same Smokey odor as the enemy. Soap and after shave was a definite no-go. Anyone with a cough would be excluded from the patrol.
If it was a night mission special efforts to subdue equipment and faces would be done and there would be special attention paid to night vision equipment and signal gear. In addition with smaller recon patrols the unit may load their magazines with exclusively tracer rounds so if contact was made they would temporarily appear to be a larger more heavily armed unit than they were. Tape was placed on all sling swivels or slings would be removed altogether. Tape was placed across the plastic surfaces of M-16s to subdue their glare and improve noise discipline. Because Recondo units had often been issued 30 round banana magazines before the army had proper pouches built, empty canteen pouches were often used. Magazines incidently were always loaded a few rounds short to insure proper feeding. Once loaded they were tapped across the back surface to seat the rounds properly inside the magazine. These canteen pouches accommodated dual and even three magazines taped together which was commonly done. Bird chirp devices like you see in nature shops were sometimes carried to signal one another and to throw off probing enemy forces who wouldn’t expect birds to gather in a brushy clump occupied by a human. A Boot string was often attached to the front site arch in an M-16 so the weapon wouldn’t be lost if dropped in a stream or set down at night. These were often attached to a carbineer (snap link) on the LRRPs web gear.
Once prepared the patrol leader would gather his troops and share the complete details of the patrol mission. He would assign duties and lay out order of movement, actions at danger areas and his plan when at the objective. For actions at the objective he’d use sand tables or terrain boards to clarify his intent. He’d share with as much detail as possible the same formula he received at the briefing from headquarters. SITUATION, MISSION, EXECUTION, ADMINISTRATION, LOGISTICS, COMMAND & CONTROL, SUPPLY & SUPPORT. He’d seek questions and quiz his patrol members to insure complete understanding. He’d provide a final assembly departure time and announce hard times for inspections and rehearsals if deemed necessary. Prior to departure a commo check would be made, inspection and weapons check conducted. Each group would clearly understand who was assigned which tasks, who was responsible for what equipment and what the chain of command was from top to bottom and why the mission was important. Each man knew who was to be in which truck or helicopter and what the order of arrival as well as the order of movement was to be throughout the mission. A typical six man patrol of course all fit in a single helicopter unless inserted by STABO rigs.
Following this the patrol would move to the departure point to be loaded into trucks and brought to the line of departure or helicopter pad. Once there they typically waited ridiculously long while the cogs of the big green machine caught up with their needs. During this time some men sharpened knives, re-seated rounds in their magazines, fiddled with gear or tried to catch a few winks.
As the choppers arrived the troops loaded typically from a 45 degree angle from the front to each side of the chopper. In this way the pilot could see them and insure that the blades were pitched such that they wouldn’t decapitate any of the troops. And visually gauge when the chopper was loaded. Note that this was not true of the huge C-47 where you never approached from the front as the blade pitch was dangerously low at times. Far lower for example then a Huey! (With C-47s you always approached from the rear.) Each of the slicks would gain altitude and gather for their short trip to the LZ. Flying low to the ground the choppers would reduce their radar signature and the amount of time they would be exposed to ground fire. Typically the force would fake several landings at phony LZs. Once the troops were inserted the choppers would visit several additional sites again to confuse the enemy about where the troops were dropped. In Vietnam cutouts of soldiers were sometimes propped up in the chopper doors so enemy ground scouts would think the choppers still had troops on board.
Occasionally when no LZ was available large enough to accommodate a helicopter touch down, troops would either rappel into a tiny clearing or climb down rope ladders. This was practiced and trained on repeatedly back at base. Another more spectacular procedure was to be transported to the DZ by STABO rig. With a STABO rig, three troops would hook together using a special harness and be transported while suspended well below the helicopter. The helicopter or helicopters would fly low with the Recondo troops literally skimming the trees. This system was later improved with a better release mechanism called a Maguire Rig which was named after its creator. To my knowledge it is still in use today. Insertion or extraction by Maguire rig was rare but quite exciting especially at night. I did three such insertions/extractions which I think are more exciting then a night combat jump (I never however did a night combat jump)
Once on the ground the patrol typically moved slightly away from the LZ and laid low for 20 minutes to an hour to insure that the area was secure before moving out. They would report their situation just prior to departure often simply with a series of break squelch signals to avoid talking. Often few words were spoken even on a two or three day patrol. When words were shared they were shared in a low, close whisper. Their order of movement away from the LZ was pre-ordained and they frequently stopped to orient and assess the situation. They always had a point man designated. In deep enemy penetrations he occasionally might wear an enemy uniform with an AK-47 to delay immediate recognition in a chance encounter. As critical to the patrol as the point man, a rear security man focused on the area to the rear at all times.
While moving it was critical that the point man always remain in sight of the number two man. This distance would change frequently due to the terrain. At roads, trails or streams the patrol would typically halt and the patrol leader would be informed. The manner in which the patrol crossed these danger areas was rehearsed and done in accordance with the units SOPs and the situation. Typically the point man would halt the patrol and indicate a danger area (stream, trail, open area etc.) The patrol leader would indicate how he wanted it handled. Usually one, (occasionally two) men would cross and scout out the other side and the flanks. Forming a wide, heart like shape pattern of search to insure no enemy forces were there. Then the unit might cross simultaneously on line, singularly, or in small groups sprinting across. On the other side the process would typically be reversed and they would return to their original order of movement. Often times, known road streams or trails were designated as phase lines and the patrol leader might inform headquarters of their location at that time. They would typically refer to phase lines rather than grid coordinates.
Enroute there would be a number of route rally points where the unit would gather to asses the situation, disseminate where they were, or share details on what had happened. Small units would typically form a tight circle in these gatherings so maps could be pointed at and conversations (if done) could be done in a whisper. The small groups of typically six men would lay heel to heel in a circle facing outward whenever they stopped. This is the position they would lay in during the night. These locations were called RONs (Remain Over Night) and they were usually in preordained locations though they seldom stayed where originally planned due to the actual ground terrain or enemy situation. Often they would establish a RON at dusk but would have an alternative location 150 yards away or so that they would move quietly into, slightly after dark. This would provide additional security in the event they were spotted by the enemy earlier. Late in the war LRRPs were encouraged not to set out claymore mines around these RONs as experience taught them that to do so encouraged them to stay put too long if moved on by the enemy. If contact was made during the night they had a preplanned direction and gathering place some distance away. Usually at a location that couldn’t be missed even at night in the confusion of flight. A stream bed, low rise or trail head might be that point.
A fighting withdrawal from the RON (or while enroute) was rehearsed over and over and precise procedures were in place. Typically the patrol leader would shout out a clock designation and distance. EXAMPLE: “4 o’clock 300” and that meant withdraw in the direction of 4 o’clock from the direction of past movement, go 300 yards and gather there. Two patrol members would empty their magazines in the direction of the enemy while the others ran about 20 meters. Two predetermined members would then crouch and fire while the rest continued to run and the original two ran past trying to reload a magazine on the run. The next two would drop and fire and this would continue until contact was broken from the enemy. Once at the hasty rally point a quick assessment was made, everyone was accounted for and the patrol quickly headed out in a different direction from the route just taken. Note that during the withdrawal the firing was un- aimed fire. It was strictly intended to get the enemy to take cover and not follow or place aimed shots on the men running. CS gas was often dispersed to throw off pursuers or affect their dogs.
If all went well and contact wasn’t made enroute, the patrol would gather at the Objective Rally Point. All elements (even on a fairly large patrol such as a raid or ambush) would gather at this location forming a circle. Raids and Ambush patrols (Often called heavies) usually consisted of 10 or more men. Point or area recon patrols were usually four to six man patrols. Regardless of the size of the element, the location of the Objective Rally Point was critical. It should be easily defended for a brief period of time, easy for all elements to find even in a hurry and at night and while close to the objective, out of line of site and not likely to be stumbled upon by enemy patrols.
From the Objective Rally Point the Patrol leader and element leaders should move out to conduct a final leader’s recon. They would carefully approach the location of the ambush or objective of their raid. If it was an ambush location they would post security on the main approaches so they could be warned of enemy approach while inspecting the intended kill zone. If possible they would view the objective from all sides. Care would be taken to insure there were no signs of their presence within the kill zone that might alert the enemy that something was amiss. Once they completed the recon they returned to the ORP cautiously. Typically a silent challenge will be made with a password and counter sign. Often a designated number was used. EXAMPLE: The pass number for a given patrol might be Seven. If the challenge 3 were given the counter sign would be 4 since the two add up to 7. If the challenge were 2 the counter sign would be 5. Etc. Usually these weren’t necessary at the ORP as the patrol knew the patrol members well enough to recognize their posture and mannerisms when moving. Sometimes a running password was used and repeated consistently as patrol members approached the ORP. It’s best to pick a word difficult to say by enemy soldiers. “thistle, thistle, thistle” “Softball, softball, softball”
Once back at the ORP the patrol element leaders would conduct a final plan briefing which would then be shared with all team members. If not already posted such as during a raid patrol, The first to leave the ORP would be the security elements who would typically move out to likely enemy avenues of approach or key withdrawal route locations. (A foot bridge for instance). They would report by radio once they were in position. Often these radio reports would simply be a series of break squelches. Next would go the support element which would move to a secure firing position over looking the objective. The maneuver element with the patrol leader would move to a pre-established assault position usually in an “L” angle from the support or base of fire element. It would typically be headed by the second in command. The reason the patrol leader virtually always goes with the assault element is it is his job to insure that the mission is sufficiently completed. He must insure that the documents have been gathered, proper pictures taken, equipment destroyed, POW freed or prisoner snatched. Usually a single patrol member is left in the ORP to provide security and early warning if the ORP is compromised. Base of fire element indicates that they are ready and assault element indicates they are ready through a series of predetermined radio clicks.
A raid is characterized by surprise, maneuver and violence of action. The base of Fire or support element initiates fire and sweeps the objective mercilessly. Typically it fires from a range that allows for penetrating fire but too far away for effective counter fire. A pre established signal is given (A flare, whistle or horn) The support element would indicate with a repeated whistle or flare that it had received the request for shifted fires and the support element shifts it’s fire to the side or rear of the enemy. (away from the direction soon to be occupied by the assault element.) The assault element (knowing for sure that the support element got the word) sweeps the objective moving slightly through it and beyond providing a perimeter for the mission element. (Demo team, photo team, etc.) They (The mission team) place their charges, gather their Intel, take their pictures, search bodies or snatch their POW. Throughout this event the Support Element maintains constant fire to the enemy’s rear, securing the objective against counter attack and providing cover for the assault. In some cases they also sweep across the objective forming an L to the assault element again slightly beyond the objective. A signal is given by the patrol leader that the mission is completed and the assault element withdraws back to the ORP. This signal might be a flare, colored smoke, a horn, whistle or just loud shouts. An example of this series of whistle signals might be: A single long blast indicates initiate fire, Two blasts (repeated by the support element) might indicate shift fire or move up and across the objective. Finally Three blasts (repeated by both elements) might indicate mission completed move back to the rally point. The sequence for returning to the ORP was typically: The assault (mission) element, followed by the support element. Finally the security elements returns except any that might be placed to cover the withdrawal route. Once back at the ORP a quick count is made of all patrol members. There was typically, a quick disseminations of what happened and any intel (shared with all patrol members) and the patrol moved out. Even an ambush patrol and point reconnaissance mission was conducted and carried out in this way with an ORP and planned route in and out.
The withdrawal route from the ORP was always different than the route taken in to avoid the possibility that if they were spotted going in they could be ambushed coming out. Whenever possible the Pick up Zone (PZ) would be different than the LZ. (Same reason) The patrol leader would call in results of the mission and move out smartly taking equal or greater care going out as he used going in as in this case the enemy was fully aware and alert to the patrols presence. The extraction point was typically quite close to the objective relative to the LZ. If the execution of the patrol consisted of moving through friendly lines from a forward area or fire base this was often the scariest and most dangerous part of the mission. Friendly lines typically aren’t, especially at night. Procedures there were elaborate and merit a complete article!
There might be several patrols going on at once. Progress of the patrols was constantly monitored by the Operations Center. Many times units were beyond normal radio transmission range so relay stations were created and manned deep in enemy territory. The sole purpose of these relay stations was to transmit details of one or more patrols’ progress back to base. Often times these relay stations were placed on high ground and used large antenna extensions. Usually the simultaneous patrols were on different frequencies so their click signals would not be misinterpreted. Sometimes they were on the same frequencies so they would know immediately what was going on with their sister unit. Patrols almost always had the frequencies for the other units so if they heard distant shooting they could switch freqs to monitor what was going on. Some patrols lost radio contact and were literally never heard from again. If a radio ceased to function for whatever reason a mission would usually be aborted or cut short. If radio contact was lost for a prolonged period an alternative PZ location and time was established so a unit out of contact knew where to go and at what time to expect extraction.
Once back, all patrol members went through an elaborate debrief from the headquarters unit S-2 Intelligence officer and the unit stood down by turning in drawn equipment (once cleaned). They then took a well deserved rest and recuperation that typically lasted several days. It was typically equal to or greater than the duration of the patrol. A three day patrol would usually earn at least 5 days of well deserved stand down.
Othere articles of pre-work for the school Include: Ambushes, RTO procedures, Night Operations, and Immediate Action Drills,
I'd love to see some from this board attend the course so I'd get the chance to meet some of you.